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Cost Overruns of Public Sector Construction Projects: A 
Developing Country Perspective 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – Cost overrun of construction projects has been a key concern for all stakeholders of 
projects for many decades now. Many studies have been done in the past and continue to be 
done currently to understand the underlying causes of construction project cost overruns. 
However, the empirical evidence of the causes seem not be clear due to the silo approach in 
understanding the causes of construction project cost overruns. This study seeks to take the 
debate a step forward by providing an understanding of the causes of project cost overrun from 
a system’s perspective, especially from a less researched environment. 
Design/methodology/approach – Data was collected and analysed from 131 respondents who 
were mainly involved in construction works in public procurement entities in Ghana. A two-
staged approach was employed in collecting data from the respondents. The first stage involved 
an interview session with key informants in the construction industry in Ghana to ascertain the 
detailed causes of cost overrun of construction projects. The second stage focused on the 
validation of these detailed factors by a wider stakeholder group through questionnaires. Factor 
analysis was employed to consolidate these detailed factors into major causes of construction 
project cost overruns. 
Findings – The results show that there are primarily four (4) major causes of most public sector 
construction projects cost overruns. These four major causes of cost overruns are poor contract 
planning and supervision; change orders; weak institutional and economic environment of 
projects and lack of effective coordination among the contracting parties. 
Originality/value – The study provides more insights as to the critical and major factors that 
underpin public sector construction projects cost overruns and more importantly provides a 
basis for common treatment of the multiple risk factors engendering public sector construction 
projects cost overruns. 
Keywords: Public Sector, Project Cost Management, Construction projects, Exploratory 
Factor Analysis (EFA), Developing Countries 
 




Most developing countries have been experiencing economic growth over the last decades. For 
instance, Ghana, a developing country in Sub Saharan Africa has been experiencing a Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth of about 7%, on the average, between 2010 and 2017 (Ghana 
Statistical Service, 2018). The construction industry remains a very important industry for 
developing countries as the industry is responsible for providing critical infrastructure for 
major economic and social developments in these countries. As a result, the contribution of the 
construction industry to the GDP of most developing countries is relatively significant. For 
example, in Ghana, the contribution of the construction industry to the overall GDP between 
2010 and 2017 has been about 12% on the average (Ghana Statistical Service, 2018). Therefore, 
since most developing countries spend relatively significant portions of their GDPs on 
construction projects in the construction industry, it is important that the performance of 
projects in the industry is paid attention to in order to ensure efficient use of the tax payer’s 
money. Especially, in developing countries where there are fiscal challenges, this call becomes 
even more urgent. Similar to other industries, the construction industry has key measures of 
performance. One of such performance measures, especially for projects in the industry, is cost. 
This is because every client or construction project sponsor would like to have the construction 
project completed within a specified or agreed upon budget. Cost is one of three key 
performance criteria in the project management literature. Apart from cost, other performance 
criteria for projects are time and quality. These performance criteria (cost, time and quality) 
are referred to as the iron triangle (Atkinson, 1999). Generally, these performance criteria, 
consider the performance of the project, particularly, construction projects, in the immediate 
or short term. This is because, a project completing within or on budget, on time and to the 
specified quality does not necessarily mean that it would meet the client or construction project 
sponsor’s needs or satisfaction in the medium to long term. Clients or construction project 
sponsors may have other requirements or needs (in the medium to long term) for which the 
project is thought of. Other performance measures other than cost, time and quality may be 
necessary to measure the performance of the construction projects in such time zones (medium 
and long terms) other than the short or immediate term.  
The cost criterion, however, has featured prominently in most definitions of project 
management performance, particularly success. For example, the UK Association of Project 
Management (APM) Body of Knowledge (BoK), other pioneer and recent authors (Wright, 
1997; Turner, 1993; Morris and Hough, 1987; Wateridge, 1998; deWit, 1988; McCoy, 1987; 
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Pinto and Slevin, 1988; Saarinen, 1990; Rosenfeld, 2014; Ahiaga-Dagbui et al., 2017; Ortiz et 
al., 2018) have all placed the cost criterion at the cutting edge of construction project success. 
Even though the definition of project success has been expanded to include other factors, the 
cost factor remains central (Papke-Shields, 2010). Recognising project cost as major risk factor, 
the Project Management Institute’s (PMI) has included project cost management as one of the 
ten knowledge areas every project manager must master (PMI, 2000).  
Despite its recognition by project managers as critical to project success over half a century 
now, construction projects continue to suffer budget overruns to date. Consequently, 
researchers have made several attempts to diagnose the causes of the perennial cost overruns 
in a bid to find a sustainable antidote to the risks associated with it (see Flyvbjerg et al. 2002; 
Flyvbjerg, 2009; Jennings, 2012; Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003; Love et al., 2012; Okmen and 
Öztas, 2010; Skitmore and Ng, 2003; Rahman et al., 2013; Vu et al., 2016; Ullah et al., 2018). 
For example, Flyvbjerg et al (2003) reported that 258 projects representing 90% of roads and 
rail projects in 20 countries experienced cost overruns. The authors indicated that while roads 
projects suffered an average of 20%, rail projects encountered an average of 45% budget 
excesses and, therefore, concluded that the risk of construction cost overrun has not reduced 
over the past 70 years, despite the debate on its causes and potential solutions in literature and 
practice. Ameyaw and Oteng-Seifah (2010) report an average of 23% cost overrun of 62 
building projects surveyed in Ghana. Asiedu and Alfen (2014) reported similar findings with 
72% out of 321 public building projects recording cost overruns in Ghana. Beside the 
abundance of evidence regarding the incidence of cost overruns, there is no consensus among 
researchers and practitioners on the causes of this undesirable global phenomenon. The triggers 
of this risk appear to be numerous, dynamic and country as well as sector specific. Even though 
several studies have attempted to identify the causes of cost overruns in different countries, 
previous authors have sought to treat the factors in silos with little emphasis on the 
interrelationships amongst the factors. The purpose of this study is therefore to identify how 
the individual and detailed factors that engender cost overruns in public sector construction 
projects in developing countries interrelate. In other words, this study seeks to explore, if there 
are some unobserved or latent variables underneath the myriad and detailed factors that 
engender cost overruns in public sector construction projects in developing countries. The 
identification of such interrelationships between the detailed causative cost overrun factors or 
latent variables will provide an easy and effective basis for proffering common treatments or 




The study, generally, is structured into six sections. The first section deals with the introduction 
where the motivation for this study is presented. The second section provides a literature review 
on construction project cost overruns. The third section deals with the methodology for the 
study. In the fourth section, the results of the analysis are presented. The fifth section considers 
the discussions of the study results and finally the sixth section provides conclusions to the 
study, points out the limitations of the study and indicates pointers for future research on the 
phenomenon under consideration.     
  
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Incidence of Cost Overruns 
A lot of factors have been considered to cause construction projects cost overruns in 
construction project management literature. Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith (2014) classifies the 
sources of cost overruns over a continuum of attributes such as risk and uncertainties (Skitmore 
and Ng, 2003; Okmen and Öztas, 2010), strategic misrepresentation and optimism bias 
(Flyvbjerg et al. 2002; Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003; Jennings, 2012), scope creep (Love et 
al., 2012), and suspicious foul play and corruption (Wachs, 1990; Flyvbjerg, 2009). 
The construction industry is arguably one of the most challenging, dynamic and risky industries 
(Mills, 2001). The industry is often exposed to all manner of risks such as changes in scope of 
works, financial distress and cash flow challenges, unstable ground conditions as well as 
materials and labour shortages with cost and time ramifications. Generally, the industry has a 
poor reputation for managing risk which has resulted in many projects failing to meet their cost 
targets (Raftery, 1994; Mills, 2001; Matta & Ashkenas, 2003; Flyvbjerg et al., 2004; Evans, 
2005; Enshassi & Ayyash, 2014; Kim et al., 2018). Tah and Carr (2000), differentiates between 
risk and risk factors. According to Tar and Carr, risk factors do not directly affect project 
activities but do so through risk. The distinction drawn between the two leads to the assumption 
that risks are triggered by risk factors.  An effective evaluation of the risks involved in 
construction projects is a significant requirement for managing construction projects 
successfully. Such a risk evaluation will lay a sound foundation for proffering appropriate risk 
mitigation measures and actions for effective management of construction projects (Paek et al., 
1993). Molenaar (2005) identify three forms of risks that confront a project - known/knowns 
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(known and quantifiable), the known/unknowns (known but unquantifiable) and the 
unknown/unknowns (unrecognised risk). Cooper and Chapman (1987) classify risks into two 
major forms - primary and secondary risks according to their nature and magnitude. Tar and 
Carr (2000) categorised risks into internal and external risk factors.  
 
Some researchers have identified more unsuspecting sources of construction projects cost 
overruns. A study by Flyvbjerg (2008) identifies three possible reasons behind cost overruns: 
“technical explanations” (Flyvbjerg, 2002; 2005) “political-economic explanations (Flyvbjerg, 
2002) and “psychological explanations” (Flyvbjerg, 2007). Technical explanations are the 
commonest reasons behind overruns (Flyvbjerg, 2009) and have gained much more credence 
amongst estimators and project managers (Flyvbjerg 2002; 2005). Technical explanations are 
linked to lack of experience on the part of estimators, imperfect forecasting techniques, honest 
mistakes, inherent problems in predicting the future and inadequate data, etc. (Flyvbjerg 2002; 
2005).  Flyvbjerg et al. (2002; 2005) and Wachs (1990) also associate overruns in large 
infrastructure projects to political-economic and psychological explanations. The political 
explanations suggest that project planners and sponsors during forecasting strategically and 
deliberately overestimate benefits and underestimate cost in order to maximize the chances of 
the project getting funded. The psychological explanations accounts for inaccuracies in 
estimation traced from what the psychologists refer to as optimism bias and planning fallacy 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003). 
Optimism bias is described as the cognitive predisposition to evaluate future events in a more 
positive light than they actually are in reality (Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003). The concept of 
planning fallacy describes the situation where decision makers decide based on delusional 
optimism instead of rational weighting of gains, losses and probabilities by overestimating 
benefits and underestimating costs (Flyvbjerg, 2009). Meanwhile, unlike strategic 
misrepresentation, the concept of optimism bias cannot be equated to strategic 
misrepresentation because it does not evolve from deceptive intent.  
 
Essentially, the three main causes of construction projects cost overruns (technical 
explanations, political-economic explanations and psychological explanations) as indicated by 
Flyvbjerg (2008) reinforce the “double-void contexts” in respect of the institutional and 
economic environments in most developing countries in which projects take place (Ofori-
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Dankwa & Julian, 2011). In most developing countries, there exist institutional and resource 
voids. The institutional voids are reflected in the absence of market-supporting institutions, 
specialized intermediaries and contract-enforcing mechanism (Khanna and Palepu, 2006), 
while the resource voids represent the lack of appropriate human resources, financial resources 
and other relevant capabilities. Both voids are deemed to play critical roles in cost overruns of 
construction projects in developing countries contexts. For instance, where very competent and 
strong institutions exist, the challenge of “political-economic” and “psychological 
explanations” to construction projects cost overruns could be held in check or moderated 
appropriately. Again, the development and availability of appropriate human resources can 
deal with the “technical explanations” associated with cost overruns. 
 
2.2 Beyond Delusional and Deceptive Factors 
Davies et al. (2014) has emphasised that, an effective risk management approach can provide 
a framework to identify and assess potential risks so that response actions can be taken to 
mitigate them. According to Love et al. (2009; 2012), whereas the reasons proffered by 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2005) contributed to ameliorating the understanding as to why economic 
infrastructure projects experience cost overruns, further investigations are required. While the 
studies by Love et al. (2009), looked at social infrastructure projects such as schools, hospitals 
and museums with cost below A$ 33 million, the studies carried out by Flyvbjerg focused on 
mega projects defined as projects that cost in excess of US$ 1 billion (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). 
Love et al. posit that albeit optimism bias and misrepresentation could be potential reasons 
behind overruns in large public funded infrastructure projects, these reasons cannot be 
generalised for all projects within the construction industry.  According to Ahsan and Gunawan 
(2009), the soft and often intangible objectives of basic social infrastructure projects developed 
to meet the basic living standards of the citizenry raises unique challenges. One major 
underlying reason is that unlike the smaller projects, mega projects tend to receive a lot of 
media attention and public furore throughout the entire development process because the 
community often contribute to their funding (Love et al., 2012; Masrom et al., 2015).  
 
Love et al. (2009) argue that an appreciable amount of projects end up with overruns outside 
the effects of delusions (optimism bias) and deception (strategic misrepresentation). Hence to 
attribute all overruns to just optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation is not only overly 
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simplistic but also misleading especially considering the multifaceted web of variables and 
conditions that interact with one another during the procurement process (Love et al., 2012). 
The rebuttal from Love et al. (2012) therefore suggests a shift in focus away from deception 
and delusions and a consideration of the intermediary events and actions that contribute to cost 
overruns. They posit that the underlying factors that are resident within the environment within 
which social infrastructure projects are procured act in congruence to destabilize the 
functioning and management of the project. This position taken by Love et al. debunks the 
explanation of foul play as suggested by Wachs (1990) and Flyvbjerg (2009) and rather point 
to the events that take place at the pre-contract and post-contract stages of construction. This 
position is largely shared by Ahsan and Gunawan (2009), Creedy et al. (2010) and Odeck 
(2004). Both the internal and external environments of construction projects are dynamic and 
relatively uncertain and hence the changes that occur during a project’s development may have 
major and normally unpredictable effects on its organisation and management (Love, Wang, 
& Tiong, 2013). With cost overrun as a global phenomenon, there are bound to be different 
factors competing for dominancy depending on several factors which include geographical 
location, level of development, client type, size of project, the culture of the people, etc. 
However, many of the risk management approaches developed by contractors and their 
consultants are not dynamic enough to analyse and assess risks (Too and Too, 2010). As a 
result, communicating construction project risks become poor, incomplete, and inconsistent 
throughout the construction supply chain.  
 
3. Research Method 
A preliminary interview of eighteen (18) experts in the Ghanaian Construction Industry was 
conducted which resulted in the identification of twenty two (22) detailed factors that engender 
cost overruns. The purpose of the interviews was to understand and solicit from these key 
experts the underlying causes of cost overruns of construction projects in the public sector after 
Adaku et al. (2018). During the interviews, understanding and prior knowledge of the causes 
of cost overruns in construction projects from previous studies were also discussed and shared 
with the experts to verify their validity in the Ghanaian construction project environment. 
These experts comprised professionals in the Ghanaian Construction Industry and academics 
who research into the built environment. These twenty two (22) detailed factors formed the 
basis of the design of closed ended questionnaires targeting practitioners of construction within 
the public sector. According to Chan (1998), the response rate of a survey questionnaire is a 
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function of the layout and its physical attractiveness. The structure and language of the survey 
questionnaire was therefore guided by considerations of appeal from respondents, ease of 
reading and understanding by both technical and non-technical respondents.  
Gill and Johnson (2010) indicate that piloting is necessary because it is difficult to predict how 
respondents will interpret and react to the questions. An initial draft of the questionnaires was 
therefore pre-tested with 15 construction professionals from industry and academia comprising 
5 architects, 5 engineers and 5 quantity surveyors in order to check for clarity and verify 
completeness of the questions in capturing the relevant factors. The necessary feedback 
received after the pre-testing was assessed and then considered where necessary, thus ensuring 
the questionnaire addressed the core issues of the research.   
Owing to the absence of a comprehensive list of contractors, poor addressing system from 
which an accurate sampling frame could be developed and anticipated difficulty in gaining the 
support of potential respondents, a purposive sampling technique was adopted in administering 
240 questionnaires. Respondents were requested to rate the factors based on a Likert scale of 
one(1) indicating not critical and five(5) indicating extremely critical. Personal delivery 
method, which has been confirmed to yield a higher return rate, was adopted in administering 
the questionnaires. Ten (10) per cent stamped questionnaires (based on the response rate) were 
administered again to respondents who had previously fully completed and submitted their 
questionnaire to check for consistency and reliability of the earlier responses.  
 
3.1 Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis was employed to uncover the interrelationships that exist among the large 
number of variables in order to establish which of the variables could be measuring aspects of 
the same phenomenon that were thought of as contributing to cost overruns.   
Debate amongst statisticians continues about the adequate sample size permissible for 
undertaking factor analysis and has resulted in several rules of thumb (Field, 2013). For 
instance, O'Rourke et al. (2005) recommend sample sizes of at least 100 or 5 times the number 
of variables to be included in the principal component analysis.  Meanwhile, according to 
Guadagnoli and Velicer (1988), contrary to the popular rules, sample size as a function of the 
number of variables is not an important factor in determining stability but rather component 
saturation and absolute sample size.  However, Field (2013) indicates that the most significant 
factor in determining the adequacy of factor solution is not only the absolute sample size but 
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the absolute magnitude of the factor loadings as well. Hence, Guadagnoli and Velicer (1988) 
suggest that, if a factor has four or more loadings greater than 0.6, then it is adequate for factor 
analysis regardless of the sample size. The factor analysis technique was used to reduce the 
twenty two (22) detailed factors to a smaller number of unobserved or latent factors that 
engender cost overruns of public sector construction projects. Principal components analysis 
was employed to identify the unobserved or latent factors because of its ease and superior 
capability for data-reduction for extraction. Principal factor extraction with Promax rotation 
and Kaiser normalisation was performed with the use of the SPSS Factor tool on the twenty 
two (22) detailed factors, causing cost overruns of public sector construction projects, from the 
131 responses out of the 240 questionnaires administered. 
 
Table 2 indicates the percentage of variance and the cumulative percentage of variance. 
Concerning factor rotation, two approaches are usually considered. That is the oblique and the 
orthogonal approaches. An orthogonal rotation approach, including varimax, equamax, 
quartimax, among others, constrains factors to be independent of each other, while an oblique 
rotation approach, including promax, oblimin, quartimin, among others, allows factors to be 
correlated. Generally, the results of an orthogonal rotation approach are usually more complex 
than the results of an oblique rotation and can sometimes mislead with the presence of 
significant correlations among factors (See Fabrigar et al., 1999). Besides, many constructs in 
scientific studies are mostly not deemed to be independent of each other, hence the oblique 
rotation approach would be deemed fit to obtain several theoretically acceptable factors (Hair 
et al., 1998). Promax as an oblique rotation approach has been employed by a number of studies 
(Lam et al., 2008; Kärnä et al., 2009; Chan and Lee, 2009). Therefore, Promax rotation 
approach was eventually used by this study. 
 
In addition, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test is one of the tests required to examine the 
appropriateness of factor analysis for the factor extraction.  The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
measure of sampling adequacy which compares the observed correlation coefficients to the 
partial correlation coefficients can also be used to assess the adequacy of a sample size. The 
KMO statistics varies between 0 and 1 and according to Field (2013), a KMO value greater 
than 0.50 is acceptable to develop a successful factor analysis. The sample size of 131 and 
KMO of sampling adequacy of 0.85 was thus considered adequate.  
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The process of factor analysis can be categorised into two stages – factor extraction and factor 
rotation (Norusis, 1993). The main goal of factor extraction is to elicit the factors through 
principal components analysis. According to Suhr (2006), arriving at the number of factors to 
extract in a factor analysis implies retaining the factors that account for the most variance in 
the data. Two criteria were considered for factor extraction in this research: the Kaiser’s 
criterion which considers factors with an eigenvalue greater than one, Cattell’s scree test which 
shows the point at which the eigenvalues begin to level off in a plot of eigenvalue against the 
number of factors as indicated in Figure 1.  
 
4. Data Presentation 
4.1 General Profile of Respondents 
Background knowledge about the respondents to a survey of this nature helps to assess the 
reliability and integrity of the data received in order to generate confidence and credibility in 
the results (Tavakol and Dennick, 2011). A return rate of almost 55% (131 out of 240) was 
achieved in the survey comprising 33.6% clients, 22.1% contractors and 44.3% consultants. 
This relatively good response rate can be attributed to the strict adherence to the strategies 
adopted in administering and retrieving the questionnaires and possibly due to the high interest 
displayed by the respondents in the research. Additionally, all the confirmatory questionnaires 
(15) were returned. A comparison of the results between the original and the confirmatory 
questionnaires revealed 77% of the responses were similar to the ratings offered during the 
main survey. The information offered by the respondents was therefore considered consistent, 
reliable and valid. Table 1 shows the profile of the respondents that responded to the survey on 
behalf of their companies and institutions.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 1 shows that a little over 80% of the respondents had more than 5 years. Experience is a 
very important factor to consider in survey analysis, as it could always be a key cause of 
differing perceptions amongst the respondents. A greater share of the respondents had 
bachelor’s degree (40.5%) and masters’ degree (37.4%). This rich educational background of 
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the respondents coupled with the level of experience of the respondents is an indication that 
the respondents had the capacity to respond to the survey, hence enhancing the credibility of 
the responses. Table 2 shows that the first four components demonstrated eigenvalues greater 
than one (13.49, 1.87, 1.12 and 1.04) and considered very encouraging based on the eigenvalue-
one criterion because the next eigenvalue of 0.89 cannot be considered as a “near-miss”. The 
Table 2 further shows that the first four components account for approximately 80% of the total 
variance which implies that according to the “percentage of variance accounted for” criterion, 
the four components retained are appropriate.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
A careful study of the scree plot in Figure 1 also reveals several breaks within the data between 
components 1 and 4 after which it begins to flatten out beginning with component 5. 
 
  
Figure1: Scree plot 
 
The goal of factor rotation on the other hand is to make the factors more interpretable. In order 
to get factor loadings that are easy to interpret, a varimax rotation was conducted to preserve 

































the variables have high loadings. Kaming et al. (2010) defines factor loadings as simply the 
correlation between an original variable/determinant and an extracted factor and hence the 
higher the absolute value of the factor loading, the more the variable contributes to that factor. 
Table 3 displays the results of the rotated factor pattern. 
 
 






5. Discussion  
5.1 Factor One: Poor contract planning and supervision 
Factor one shows the seven variables that were extracted according to the rotated factor pattern 
account for 61.33% of the reasons behind cost overruns. A careful assessment of these seven 
variables reveals the pervasiveness of poor contract planning and supervision in respect of 
public sector construction projects.  
 
Effective contract planning and supervision within the construction industry in the public sector 
in Ghana could still be said to be in its formative stages. Dansoh (2005) observes that there is 
hardly any long term strategic planning within the public sector. Small contracts and ad hoc 
approaches are favoured over fully-fledged economic sized tenders (Anvuur et al., 2006). Poor 
planning and supervision which has equally been identified by Ahadzie (1995) as a Critical 
Failure Factor (CFF) of construction projects within the GCI significantly reveals the technical 
incompetence of the project team with regards to the clear understanding of scope of works, 
project schedule management, realistic cost forecasting and estimation and baseline planning 
for effective controlling and monitoring over the project execution period. An appropriate 
reporting and feedback process is essential in ensuring an effective project monitoring and 
controlling. However, in most public sector construction projects in Ghana, there is lack of 
effective monitoring and controlling mechanisms in place leading to failures (particularly cost) 
of such projects. Doloi (2013) has observed that the lack of frequent and effective supervision 
and communication by consultants to relevant project stakeholders for timely remedial actions 
to be taken explain contractors’ inability to keep up with projects performance targets. About 
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80% of the consultants in Ghana have their offices located in the capital city, Accra.  
Meanwhile most of the public sector construction projects are located across the country and 
very remote from the capital city, Accra (Amoah et al., 2011). This situation undermines the 
effective monitoring and controlling of the public sector construction projects by the 
consultants. Besides, extreme competition amongst consultants in the Ghanaian Construction 
Industry (GCI) forces most professionals to accept unrealistically low fees. Research according 
to Love et al. (2010) has proven that a key factor contributing to poor project planning and 
documentation, sub-optimal designs and supervision is the level of fees paid to consultancy 
firms. Effective construction project planning and supervision involve identifying activities 
and resources (on the part of the consultants) required to ensure the performance targets of the 
projects are achieved. However, the low levels of fees charged by the consultants usually 
undermine the effectiveness of the supervision. Again, the poor contract and project planning 
processes delay the project tendering processes and eventually lead to project cost overruns, 
especially in a project environment where the macroeconomic indicators are unstable and 
inflation is very volatile. The poor contract and project planning processes can be partly 
explained by political expediency and corruption among the public project implementing 
agencies. As a result, several projects are rushed and awarded before the financing arrangement 
and final budget approval.  
 
According to Frimpong et al. (2003) and Al-Momani (2000), harsh weather conditions reduce 
productivity and delays the progress of works. The temperature in Ghana during the dry season 
can fluctuate between 30-38 °C with high humidity levels ranging between 25% to 80% 
eventually reducing labour productivity. Frimpong et al. (2003) and Okpala (1986) indicate 
that the high temperature and humidity levels generate body heat that causes workers to feel 
dull and uncomfortable which leads to stress. Unfortunately, most of the consultants and 
contractors on public sector construction projects in Ghana are unable to account for the cost 
of the harsh weather conditions during the contract and project planning phase. This leads to 
underestimation of the project costs and serves as a risk factor for construction project cost 
overruns. Again, under this factor, several projects are executed without much economic 
justification but championed through optimism bias or deliberate underestimation or 
incomplete design (see for instance, Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Wells, 2013). All of these 
developments pose risks for construction projects cost overruns.  
15 
 
5.2 Factor Two: Change orders 
The second factor which extracted five variables is described as change orders and is 
associated with contract alterations such as additions, deletions or modifications. The factor 
explains a total of 8.54% of the total variance and has traditionally been considered as one of 
the major reasons behind cost overruns. Changes in the design protocols and processes can 
engender bespoke problems (Love et al., 2011). According to Rowland (1981), change orders 
is an “indication that something on a construction project has not gone as planned” and may 
result in either additional cost or time or both. Change orders issued to correct or modify the 
original design or scope of work during construction is inevitable for most projects (Alnuaimi 
et al., 2009). The FIDIC condition of contract indicates that “no variation can vitiate a 
contract”. However the client’s right to initiate a change order is compensated by the 
contractor’s right to an equitable adjustment in the contract price and duration.  
The quality of a design is a function of the degree of consultancy services required, the method 
of selecting consultants and how fees are negotiated (Love et al., 2011). Errors and 
discrepancies in design and changes on the project during the implementation are suggestive 
of shortcomings and lack of due diligence during the planning and development stage of the 
project (Asiedu and Alfen, 2015). Unfortunately most projects commence hastily because of 
political expediency while some contracts by their arrangements may not permit pre-contract 
site visit for feasibility studies because a single design is meant to be repeated across the 
country. This phenomenon encourages the excessive use of prime cost and provisional sums 
which enhances the chances of collusion between consultants/public officials and contractors. 
Collusion according to Wells (2013) festers because contractors are eager to recover potential 
losses or money spent on bribes. Bordat et al. (2004) suggest the implementation of a change 
order management as a means to address change orders even though in the view of Alsuliman 
et al. (2012) change order management is still not fully understood. The prevalence of several 
“no-recorded-reason” for change orders usually leads to construction project scope creep and 
subsequently cost overruns.  
5.3 Factor three: Weak institutional and economic environment of projects  
Five variables were extracted under factor three which account for 5.1% of the total variance.  
An assessment of these five variables reveals an inherent weak institutional and economic 
environment of projects. The weak institutional environment of projects represents the 
inadequate institutional capacity, particularly human resource, as well as the inefficiencies 
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embedded in the processes of delivering public sector construction projects. The human 
capacity required to deliver successful public sector construction projects is not only deficient 
among the construction project contractors and consultants but also client representatives such 
as the procurement officers within the various public procurement entities. The success of a 
project depends, to some extent, on the technical competence of the project team (Aje, 2012; 
Larson and Gray, 2018). The fact that these three variables (poor budget estimation of project 
cost sent to Ministry of Finance (MoF) by implementing agencies, poor calibre of contractors 
reflected in the contractor’s technical staff and deficiencies within the public procurement 
process) were loaded on the same factor emphasises the need to build the capacity of 
procurement officers (within the various public procurement entities) as well as contractors.  
 
Section 59 of the Public Procurement Act (PPA) (Act 663 as amended: 2003) is explicit on the 
selection criteria of the contractor with lowest evaluated tender price which according to Wells 
(2013) conforms to the requirements by multilateral development banks. The over reliance on 
price as the key determining factor for selecting contractors and consultants (Love et al., 2010) 
which facilitates subjectivity, nepotism and corruption has also been identified as a major cause 
of most project delivery problems (Aje, 2012). This approach is risky, considering the fact that 
in the lean season when there are no jobs, contractors are more likely to offer lower tenders 
just to remain in business with the hope of raising additional claims or carrying out sub-
standard works during the project execution to compensate for any possible loss due to the 
under-pricing of construction projects (Aje, 2012). Reports citing poor capacity of procurement 
officials have also been indicated (Ameyaw et al., 2010; Osei-Tutu et al., 2011). Section 21 of 
the Public Procurement Act (PPA), Act 663 as amended: 2003, requires officers to prepare a 
procurement plan to be submitted to the MoF for consideration into the budget which forms 
part of the basis for budgetary allocations for a fiscal year in the public sector. Underestimation 
of the preliminary project cost, at the public procurement entity level, leads to poor budgeting 
for construction projects and eventual cost overruns. 
Eyiah and Cook (2003) and Anvuur et al. (2006) reveal a lengthy payment process beyond 
thirty steps within the GCI. Several public officers who are not technically qualified within the 
bureaucratic process are required to visit the site and certify the valuation prepared by the 
project consultants. According to Osei-Tutu et al. (2010), Interim Payment Certificates (IPCs) 
and letters emanating from the project consultant or contractor’s office are deliberately delayed 
by middle or lower ranked public officials resulting in petty corruption. Corrupt public officials 
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tend to disregard the order of submission of IPCs by contractors and rather use their position 
to honour payment to contractors who are able to pay more bribes (ibid).  
 
Again, with the weak macroeconomic structures and indicators, most developing countries 
suffer from excessive increases in material and labour prices over project durations.  The 
undesirable economic environment, in which projects are carried out, makes most public sector 
construction projects in developing countries vulnerable to cost overruns.  
 
5.4 Factor four: Lack of effective coordination among the contracting parties 
Five variables were extracted under factor four which in total explains 4.73% of the total 
variance. An assessment of these variables reveals the lack of effective coordination among the 
contracting parties during the design and execution stage. Communication gaps over the design 
phase between project consultants and the client can deny the project consultants of vital 
information, which can lead to underestimation of cost, and excessive change orders during the 
execution phase. According to Love et al. (2009), several professionals deliberately violate 
established conventions when put under pressure to produce documentation, albeit such 
practices are inappropriate.  
The need for a comprehensive design brief, clients proposed cash flow outlook, clients financial 
contingency plans, specifications, contract type, the urgency of the project and expected 
completion date, among others, need to be thoroughly discussed and all ambiguities clarified 
before kick starting construction projects. Transparency is essential in fostering and enhancing 
a seamless coordination and integration amongst the project team.  Errors and discrepancies 
in the contract document and lack of communication and coordination during the design stage 
between consultants and public procurement entities hinder contractors’ performance and 
engender disputes leading to prolonged contract durations.  According to Akinci and Fischer 
(1998), errors and discrepancies trigger variations which are a key source of cost overruns for 
both clients and contractors. Again, Wells (2013) indicates that contract variations undermine 
the accuracy and certainty with which construction project costs are estimated and thus provide 
an avenue for several negotiations and opportunistic tendencies by project parties, especially 
contractors. The proficiency of the consultants design efficiency depends also to a large extent 
on the consistency of the clients design brief and hence the need for the establishment of a clear 
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communication protocol. Communication barriers that engender estimating errors at the pre-
contract stage according to Wells (2013) could result in the acceptance of unrealistically low 
tender prices which provides a basis for misinformation in respect of construction project 
funding decisions and arrangements. Protracted and intractable delays and uncertainties 
surrounding payment for work done on government projects according to Wells (2013) and 
Tuuli et al. (2007) weaken government’s bargaining power and are major reasons why 
contracts are not enforced whiles lack of enforcement of contract provisions by all parties 
creates time at large scenarios. Payment delays often drives contractors to desperation, ruins 
their profitability, cripples their professional integrity and inhibits their zeal for doing a good 
work on time (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements [UNCHS], 1996). The need for 
the project consultant to offer early warning signs on delayed activities is as important as the 
client engaging the contractor on alternative measures about payment challenges before they 
occur. Government’s reluctance to compensate contractors for payment delays makes it 
unjustifiable for consultants to also enforce Liquidated and Ascertained Damages (LADs) 
clauses in contracts in cases of delays.  
 
Overdependence on imported construction materials either as finished products or raw 
materials often tends to delay progress of works and has been a major reason for price 
escalations. Ghana is largely a consuming economy and imports virtually about 80% of its 
construction inputs (Arku, 2009). Until recently, Ghana had only one cement manufacturing 
company that monopolised the whole construction industry and hence annual shut down of part 
of its production sections for routine and periodic maintenance works resulted in artificial 
scarcity and resulting in artificial price hikes due to panic buying. It is essential that the 
contractor is always in constant touch with its major suppliers to avert any surprises along the 
supply chain while any attempt to alter the design specification need to factor in the availability 
of the new material. 
 
6. Conclusions and limitations of the study 
The study sought to understand the reasons behind cost overruns of public sector projects in a 
less developed economy environment. This extends and contributes to the debate on the factors 
that engender cost overruns of projects in more developed economies and emerging economies. 
In achieving the study objective, data was collected and analysed from 131 respondents who 
were mainly involved in construction works in public procurement entities in Ghana. The factor 
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analyses of the twenty two (22) detailed causes of cost overruns of public sector project projects 
in Ghana show that there are primarily four (4) major causes to why most public sector 
construction projects overrun in cost. These four major causes of cost overruns are poor 
contract planning and supervision (explaining about 61.33% of the reasons why public sector 
construction projects overrun in cost); change orders (explaining 8.54% of cost overruns in 
public sector construction projects); weak institutional and economic environment of projects 
(explaining 5.10% of variance) and lack of effective coordination among the contracting parties 
(also explaining 4.73% of the variance).  
 
Poor contract planning and supervision providing the most explanation for public sector 
projects cost overruns accentuates the problem of low accountability in the public sector 
systems in most developing countries or economies. To address this problem, it will be 
necessary to develop proper contract planning and supervision protocols for the public sector 
system.  Again, in Ghana, adherence to these protocols by the public procurement entities 
should be demanded by bodies such as Public Procurement Authority (PPA) and the Audit 
Service. Such an accountability measure will streamline contract planning and supervision 
processes within public procurement entities and minimise the risks of project cost overruns. 
Besides, to address the phenomenon of poor contract planning and supervision which is 
underpinned by the problem of low accountability in the public sector, a national legislation 
which requires mandatory evaluations of public sector construction projects will be necessary. 
Such a legislation must, among others, focus on public sector construction project audits. The 
evaluation exercise will not only promote accountability in public sector construction projects 
but will also provide an opportunity for learning and improvement in the delivery of public 
sector construction projects. The national legislation must make National Development 
Planning Commission (NDPC) the anchor institution for the evaluations with technical support 
from the Public Procurement Authority (PPA) and Ministry of Works and Housing (MWH). 
Our finding of change orders corroborates the finding of Amoatey et al. (2015). They also 
found changes in designs as causes of delays and excessive cost in state housing projects in 
Ghana. We submit that when attention is paid to proper contract planning and supervision in 
the public sector through the development of effective contract planning and supervision 
protocols as well as a national legislation for public construction project evaluations, it will 
have positive effects on the project implementation in the form of reduced change orders and 
effective coordination between the contracting parties. Among the contract protocols should 
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specifically be the development of a standardised project scope change request form to manage 
and alleviate the problem of change orders. The form, among other details, should capture the 
reason for the change request; the impact of the requested change as well as indicating the 
liability of the impact of the requested change. It is expected that some of these requirements 
by the form would discourage unnecessary changes to the scopes of public sector construction 
projects and minimise the risk of cost overruns. The Public Procurement Authority (PPA) could 
lead in such an effort. Again, the finding in respect of weak institutional and economic 
environment of projects would require that measures are put in place to build the capacities of 
public procurement entities as well as local contractors to effectively and efficiently deliver 
public sector construction projects.   As part of the capacity building plan, PPA could engage 
professionals and academics in the construction industry to develop standardized curriculum 
or modules based on the deficiencies identified among project teams on public sector 
construction projects. The modules could be used to train and certify persons in both public 
procurement entities and contracting firms on project management and works procurement. 
Such certification documents by relevant team members of contracting firms could be made a 
requirement by PPA when submitting a tender by contracting firms. On the other hand, persons 
in public procurement entities involved in works procurement should be required by PPA to 
obtain such certifications.  
 
Since the economic environments, in which projects are undertaken, affect the cost 
performance of public sector construction projects, it would be necessary for the government 
in Ghana and other developing countries to embark on conscious and concerted efforts to 
provide stable economic environments. 
 
This study is not without limitations. First, the use of a purposive sampling approach instead 
of a random sample limits the generalisation ability of the findings of this study. Further studies 
should seek to use approaches that broaden the sample size to make the findings more 
generalizable. Second, the use of cross-sectional data limits the causal inferences capabilities 
in respect of the findings of this study. Hence, it is encouraged that future related studies are 
carried to provide better understanding and also to validate the findings of this study. Lastly, 
this study limited the survey to only three stakeholders of public sector construction projects – 
clients, consultants and contractors. In the future, the survey should be broadened to include 
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stakeholders such as materials suppliers, banks or financial institutions, etc to shed more light 
and validate the actual causes of cost overruns in public sector construction projects.    
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Table 2: Exploratory factor analysis of cost overrun causes 
 Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sum of Squared 
Loadings 

















1 13.49 61.33 61.33 13.49 61.33 61.33 4.57 21.92 21.92 
2 1.87 8.54 69.88 1.87 08.54 69.88 4.49 21.53 43.45 
3 1.12 5.10 74.98 1.12 05.10 74.98 4.17 20.00 63.45 
4 1.04 4.73 79.71 1.04 04.73 79.71 3.39 16.26 79.71 
5 0.89 4.07 83.79       
6 0.54 2.50 86.28       
7 0.47 2.15 88.43       
8 0.43 1.97 90.40       
9 0.40 1.85 92.24       
10 0.32 1.49 93.74       
11 0.28 1.29 95.03       
12 0.23 1.05 96.08       
13 0.19 0.87 96.95       
14 0.16 0.75 97.70       
15 0.12 0.55 98.25       
16 0.10 0.44 98.69       
17 0.08 0.37 99.05       
18 0.07 0.33 99.38       
19 0.06 0.27 99.65       
20 0.03 0.13 99.79       
21 0.03 0.12 99.91       












Table 3: Factor loading and total variance explained 
ID Variables 
Factor Loadings Variance 
Explained F 1 F 2 F 3 F 4 
C1 
Lack of frequent and effective supervision by 
consultants 
0.73    
61.33 
C10 
Implementing agencies awarding contracts even before 
budget is approved by government 
0.67    
C13 Harsh weather conditions 0.53    
C17 
Inexperience and mismanagement on the part of 
consultants who handle government projects 
0.63    
C18 
Deliberate underestimation of initial project cost to 
ensure projects are implemented 
0.83    
C20 Delays between tender and contract award date 0.60    
C22 Requirements of donors in joint funding arrangements 0.55    
C8 
Variations and additional work as a result of changes 
in site conditions 
 0.66   
8.54 
C11 
Arbitrariness in the selection of a margin for price and 
physical contingency 
 0.71   
C12 
Excessive use of prime cost and provisional sums in the 
Bills of Quantities 
 0.72   
C19 
Collusion between consultants/public officials and 
contractors 
 0.66   
C21 
Variations and additional works borne out of political 
expediency 
 0.80   
C5 
Excessive increases in material and labour prices over 
the project duration 
  0.55  
5.10 
C7 
Poor budget estimation of project cost sent to Ministry 
of Finance by implementing agencies 
  0.59  
C9 
Poor calibre of contractors reflected in the contractor’s 
technical staff 
  0.74  
C15 Deficiencies with public procurement   0.71  
C16 
Excessive bribery and cronyism affecting payment for 
work done 
  0.61  
C2 
Errors and discrepancies in contract document such as 
architectural and structural designs, bills of quantities 
and specification 
   0.72 
4.73 
C3 
Lack of coordination and communication during the 
design stage between the consultants and the public 
procurement entities 










Lack of enforcement of contract provisions by all 
parties 
   0.59 
C6 
Delays and uncertainties surrounding payment of work 
done 
   0.55 
C14 
Frequent shortages in materials such as cement and 
coarse aggregates 
   0.65 
Total Variance Explained 79.70 
